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How to Audit Browser Extensions Before They Leak Data

A reader wrote to me in March about a screenshot tool he had used for four years. One week it started replacing the links on shopping sites he visited with versions that went through a tracking redirect first.

A laptop screen showing a browser extensions page with permission details open beside a notebook listing installed tools

A reader wrote to me in March about a screenshot tool he had used for four years. One week it started replacing the links on shopping sites he visited with versions that went through a tracking redirect first. He had not installed anything new. The extension had simply updated itself overnight, as extensions do, and the person who wrote it was no longer the person who owned it.

This is the part of device security almost nobody checks. People set up two factor codes, pick a password manager, learn to hover over links, and then leave nine extensions sitting in the browser with permission to read every page they open and every box they type into. An extension is not an app running in a sandbox beside your browser. It runs inside it, with whatever access you agreed to at install time and have not thought about since.

What that permission warning actually allows

The line most extensions ask for is some version of read and change all your data on all websites. In plain terms that means the extension can see the content of any page you have open, including a page you are only logged into for the next ten minutes, and it can alter that page before you see it.

So a bad extension does not need to steal your password. It can wait until you are inside your email, read what is on screen, and change the account number shown in an invoice. It can add a field to a login form. It can watch a banking page and send a copy of the text somewhere. None of that requires defeating your two factor setup, because it happens after you have already signed in. That is also why an extension with this permission is a bigger risk than an app you give a single folder to.

Permission wordingWhat it lets the extension doReasonable when
Read and change all your data on all websitesSee and rewrite every page you openPassword managers, accessibility tools, ad blockers
Read and change your data on one named siteOnly works on that domainAlmost every niche tool, and the safest form
Read your browsing historyFull list of pages and timesSession managers, some bookmark tools
Manage your downloadsStart downloads and read the download listDownload managers and video savers
Communicate with cooperating native applicationsTalk to a program installed on the computerPassword managers with a desktop app

The second row is the one to aim for. Most browsers now let you downgrade an extension to it yourself, which I will come to, and a surprising number of tools keep working perfectly afterwards.

How a good extension turns into a bad one

Almost no extension is malicious on day one, because a new extension with no users is worth nothing. The value is in an installed base that updates silently.

Three paths lead to trouble. The developer gets an offer, usually by email, to buy the project for a few thousand dollars, and a hobby tool with 200,000 users is hard to keep saying no to. Or the developer stays but adds an analytics library from a company paying per install, which quietly sends page addresses off the machine. Or the account itself gets phished, and someone pushes an update in the original developer's name. The browser treats all three as a normal version bump and installs it without asking you anything, because you already granted the permissions.

What makes this hard to notice is that the tool keeps doing its job. The screenshot extension still took screenshots. If an extension suddenly stopped working you would remove it the same day.

The twenty minute audit

Open the extensions page in your browser, chrome://extensions in Chrome, edge://extensions in Edge, or about:addons in Firefox. Put the page on one half of the screen and work down the list.

Start by removing rather than judging. For each one, ask when you last used it on purpose. If the answer is longer than a month, take it out. Nothing in security gives a better return than reducing the list to the four or five you genuinely use, and I run about five on my own machine, down from fourteen two years ago.

For the survivors, open the details panel. Check the site access setting and change it from on all sites to on click or on specific sites wherever the extension still functions. On click means nothing runs until you press the icon, which turns a permanent listener into a tool you summon. Then look at the date of the last update and the developer name and website. A tool last updated in 2021 is not necessarily dangerous, but it is unmaintained, and unmaintained extensions are the ones that get bought.

Finally read the store reviews sorted by newest, not by helpful. Users notice injected adverts and redirects fast and say so loudly, and the newest reviews are where an ownership change shows up weeks before anyone writes an article about it. While you have the habit, the same once a year sweep is worth doing on your handset, and the method is in our walkthrough on reviewing app permissions on your phone.

Two pieces of common advice I would skip

The first is to install a security extension, something that promises to warn you about dangerous sites and block trackers. I understand the appeal and I do not use one. Those extensions need the broadest permission there is, they have to be trusted absolutely, and several of the best known ones have been caught sending browsing histories to their own servers. You are adding a watcher to fix a problem caused by watchers. Your browser already blocks known malicious sites, and your own judgement on links does the rest, as covered in the piece on spotting a phishing link before you click.

The second is that sticking to the official store keeps you safe. Store review catches the obvious cases, and researchers still find batches of extensions with millions of combined installs doing things they should not. Review happens at submission, and the risk arrives at update seven. Treating the store badge as proof is the mistake.

One smaller habit also deserves correcting. People disable an extension instead of removing it, to keep the settings in case they want it back. A disabled extension still sits in your profile, still syncs to your other machines, and is one accidental click from running again. Removing it and reinstalling later costs you two minutes.

If you think one of them was already doing something

Remove it first, before you investigate, because the screenshots and the store page can wait and the access cannot.

Then think about what that extension could see while it was installed. If it had access to all sites, treat the accounts you signed into in that browser as exposed. Change the passwords for your email and anything financial, using a different device if you have one to hand, and sign out all other sessions in each account's security settings so any stolen session is dropped. Check your email address against the known breach lists as described in our note on checking if your email was in a data breach, mostly so you know what else is in circulation.

Do not reinstall a replacement the same evening. The honest finish to an audit like this is a shorter list, not a different one.

FAQ

How many extensions is too many?

There is no magic number, but every one with full site access multiplies the number of people you are trusting. If more than two or three have that level, the list is too long rather than too risky in itself.

Do extensions still work in private or incognito windows?

Only if you allowed it, and it is off by default. It is worth checking, because people assume a private window is a clean browser and an extension you enabled there has the same reach it always had.

Is Firefox safer than Chrome for extensions?

Different rather than safer. Firefox reviews a smaller catalogue and has recommended extensions that get extra scrutiny, while Chrome restricts what extensions can do with network requests more tightly than it used to. The size of your own list matters more than the browser.

Can an extension read my password manager?

It can read whatever appears on the page, so a password filled into a form is visible to an extension with full site access. That is not a reason to stop using a manager, it is a reason to keep the extension list short and to use on click access for everything that does not need more.

TK
Tomasz Kaminski

Tomasz covers computers and device security in plain language, aimed at people who just want their tech to work safely.

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